Wikileaks has revealed that the chief of army staff General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani told an American senator that it was unjust to criticise Pakistan for not locating Osama Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri and that he would place Pakistan’s track record in pursuing and capturing al-Qaida operatives up against any other country.
The Wikileaks cable sent on 11-01-2008 by the US embassy in Pakistan talks of a meeting of Ambassador and Senator Joseph Lieberman with COAS General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani January 9, 2008. “Lieberman then asked about the status of the search for Osama bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. It was unjust to criticise Pakistan for not locating these men, asserted Kayani, and he would place Pakistan’s track record in pursuing and capturing al-Qaida operatives up against any other country’s”, the cable reveals the discussion of General Kayani with US Senator.
Another Wikileaks cable, sent on 19-2-2009 ahead of Kayani’s visit to USA, and released on May 4, 2011 reveals the mindset of Americans regarding dealing with Pakistan’s military. The cable says, “But we need to lay down a clear marker that Pakistan’s Army/ISI must stop overt or tacit support for militant proxies (Haqqani network, Commander Nazir, Lashkar-e-Taiba). We should preface that conversation with an agreement to open a new page in relations; Kayani, who was ISI chief from 2004-2007, does not want a reckoning with the past. Given the GOP surrender of Swat to local Taliban, we need to press Kayani to commit his now reluctant Army to retake the area after the “peace deal” inevitably fails.”
“The military and ISI have not yet made that leap; they still view India as their principal threat and Afghanistan as strategic depth in a possible conflict with India. They continue to provide overt or tacit support for proxy forces (including the Haqqani group, Commander Nazir, Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, and Lashkar-e-Taiba) as a foreign policy tool.”
US ambassador wrote: “Kayani will want to hear that the US has turned the page on past ISI operations (he was ISI chief from 2004-2007). We should ask for his views on what political end state in Afghanistan would convince him to end proxy support for militants and probe for what would be required by India to allow him to re-deploy forces from the Indian border for the fight in FATA. The reality is that, without a redeployment, he does not have the forces (however poorly trained) to combat the insurgency in FATA.”
The Wikileaks cable sent on 11-01-2008 by the US embassy in Pakistan talks of a meeting of Ambassador and Senator Joseph Lieberman with COAS General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani January 9, 2008. “Lieberman then asked about the status of the search for Osama bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. It was unjust to criticise Pakistan for not locating these men, asserted Kayani, and he would place Pakistan’s track record in pursuing and capturing al-Qaida operatives up against any other country’s”, the cable reveals the discussion of General Kayani with US Senator.
Another Wikileaks cable, sent on 19-2-2009 ahead of Kayani’s visit to USA, and released on May 4, 2011 reveals the mindset of Americans regarding dealing with Pakistan’s military. The cable says, “But we need to lay down a clear marker that Pakistan’s Army/ISI must stop overt or tacit support for militant proxies (Haqqani network, Commander Nazir, Lashkar-e-Taiba). We should preface that conversation with an agreement to open a new page in relations; Kayani, who was ISI chief from 2004-2007, does not want a reckoning with the past. Given the GOP surrender of Swat to local Taliban, we need to press Kayani to commit his now reluctant Army to retake the area after the “peace deal” inevitably fails.”
“The military and ISI have not yet made that leap; they still view India as their principal threat and Afghanistan as strategic depth in a possible conflict with India. They continue to provide overt or tacit support for proxy forces (including the Haqqani group, Commander Nazir, Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, and Lashkar-e-Taiba) as a foreign policy tool.”
US ambassador wrote: “Kayani will want to hear that the US has turned the page on past ISI operations (he was ISI chief from 2004-2007). We should ask for his views on what political end state in Afghanistan would convince him to end proxy support for militants and probe for what would be required by India to allow him to re-deploy forces from the Indian border for the fight in FATA. The reality is that, without a redeployment, he does not have the forces (however poorly trained) to combat the insurgency in FATA.”
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